By SALAI ELAISA VAHNIE |
Less than a month after Burmese democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
concluded her highly decorated visit to the US, which was followed by
the US announcement to ease sanctions on imports from Burma, major
communal violence broke out in the western part of the country. It has
claimed more than 100 lives and resulted in thousands of internally
displaced Rohingyas. In the north, the Burmese military continues its
offensive against the Kachin Independence Army.
The continued ethnic conflict in Burma reflects the nature of the
political crisis in Burma—deeply rooted in and prolonged by the Burman
nationalistic claim that effectively utilized the world’s most
reclusive and successive military as a tool to accomplish its goals of
ethnic cleansing, a policy which ravaged 60 million people with fear
and poverty, killed thousands, and produced millions of refugees.
With the recent positive developments led by President Thein Sein, the
international community must continue to recognize that the ethnic
issue is at the heart of the country’s problem, and only when this
issue has been addressed fundamentally, with constitutional and
institutional arrangement, can a stable democratic state that respects
human rights and embraces peaceful co-existence in diversity be
realized. That is when Burma, in real sense and substance, can be
considered a democratic state that is capable of positively
contributing to regional and world peace, stability and economy.
Many may have observed that the opposition party leader Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi seems to have changed her tone—or perhaps, more correctly, her
approach toward Burma’s reform—from initially articulating the need
for constitutional reform as the most urgent necessary step in the
democratization process to that of maintaining the rule of law. It was
widely noted that she largely remained silent on the topic of the
continued violence in ethnic minorities areas while speaking during
her recent trip to the US.
Why would Suu Kyi stopped sort of pushing constitutional reform in
Burma? Has she now abandoned the ethnic minorities? There could be
differing observations. However, a common agreement seems to suggest
that she has shifted her traditionally held confrontational practice
to a more diplomatic solution-oriented engagement with the nominally
civilian government and the military for certain reasons. Will she
succeed? Will the military allow a fully democratic Burma state? It
all depends.
There are two things that the military will not allow to happen that
easily: 1) Amending the 2008-approved constitution which reserves 25
percent for the military in all legislature; 2) the forming of a
United Nations commission of inquiry to investigate crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed by the military.
Something must be done before these advancements can be pushed for and
achieved, otherwise the Burmese military will come and seize power.
What is that something? And why is that?
Burma’s ethnic conflict began during the struggle for independence in
the 1940s when violence between the Burma Independence Army (BIA),
a.k.a the 30 comrades, and the Karen ethnic group broke out. It is
important to note that BIA members were immortalized in Burman or Bama
nationalist mythology. The Karen ethnic Christian soldiers who had
been part of the British army were disarmed by the BIA as the British
retreated to India. The violence against the Karen ethnic minorities
continued and the Karen National Union (KNU) was eventually forced
into existence.
U Nu, the first prime minister of independent Burma, followed by Gen.
Ne Win, and then Snr-Gen. Than Shwe, all embraced and fostered the
Burman chauvinistic agenda—the ethnic cleansing program that became a
state policy. In the process of implementing this policy, they
committed atrocities and grave human rights violations. What happened
then?
Than Shwe and his colleagues clearly understood that a pure military
grip on power will not be sustainable in the 21st century for many
reasons: they knew the power of the people; that a 8888-style uprising
could reignite soon; that the wave of the Arab Spring could hit them;
and that the public now understand the power of technology and media.
That’s why they outsourced some smart brains to design the
Constitution approved in 2008, in which the executive branch will
impress the international community with its nominally civilian
movement while the military holds all key positions, including the
power of the commander-in-chief which can override the president any
time he feels the need to.
In other words, this constitution serves as a foundation and grants
the military absolute power. With such a likable personality,
President Thein Sein has been rather successful in his effort to ease
pressure from both the international community and from the opposition
parties. In fact, he has got US and European sanctions lifted, while
Ms. Suu Kyi has joined the parliament.
Now with 25 percent of the seats constitutionally taken by the
military in all legislatures, Daw Suu and the democratic forces will
have to do two things to overcome the military’s “red line.”
With a clear understanding that the ethnic conflict and political
crisis in Burma is a man-made crisis and is deeply rooted in the
Burman nationalistic claim and the chauvinistic political culture, the
majority Burmans have to realize and be convinced that for them to
continue to manipulate the military for their political and racial
purposes will be counterproductive.
Secondly, the Burman chauvinistic political culture has to change to
reach a negotiated constitutional agreement and a consolidated
political settlement in a federalist democracy. The young generation
must abandon the old way of racism and embrace a new way of thinking
and a democratic political culture, actively playing an important role
in the democratization process. This may desirably require organizing
a conference in the form of a second Panglong where all eight major
ethnic groups can start engaging openly to eventually reach a
negotiated agreement. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi supported this idea that
her late father Aung San started.
Something that is even more important is that all Burma stakeholders
work together to create conditions and a political environment where
the Burmese generals’ future security is guaranteed. This may include
creatively providing leeway. For this very reason, the military must
take part in Burma’s democratization process.
But all this will require a sincere and open engagement, an inclusive
process, a serious intention to create a win-win situation—that is, to
establish a federalism-based democratic country, conducive to a
long-lasting peace, where Burman, non-Burman, and all the stakeholders
together can say they have won collectively.
Executive Director of the Burmese American Community Institute based
in the US, Salai Elaisa Vahnie is a long-time political and student
activist for change in his native country Burma. He holds an MPA
degree in Policy Analysis and Comparative International Affairs. The
opinions stated in this article are the author’s and do not reflect
The Irrawaddy editorial policy.
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